From fbd14ceef7c51c96eaf1a56e598af9b63562bb2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "will.qian" <690004467@qq.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2013 22:27:28 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] will.qian is translating Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All

---
 sources/Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All.md | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sources/Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All.md b/sources/Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All.md
index 99b17ad2bb..4050e57d20 100644
--- a/sources/Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All.md	
+++ b/sources/Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All.md	
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+will.qian is translating this article.
 Linux RNG May Be Insecure After All
 ================================================================================
 > As a followup to Linus's [opinion people skeptical of the Linux random number generator][1], a new paper [analyzes the robustness of /dev/urandom and /dev/random][2] . From the paper: 'From a practical side, we also give a precise assessment of the security of the two Linux PRNGs, /dev/random and /dev/urandom. In particular, we show several attacks proving that these PRNGs are not robust according to our definition, and do not accumulate entropy properly. These attacks are due to the vulnerabilities of the entropy estimator and the internal mixing function of the Linux PRNGs. These attacks against the Linux PRNG show that it does not satisfy the "robustness" notion of security, but it remains unclear if these attacks lead to actual exploitable vulnerabilities in practice.'
@@ -14,4 +15,4 @@ via: http://it.slashdot.org/story/13/10/14/2318211/linux-rng-may-be-insecure-aft
 
 [1]:http://linux.slashdot.org/story/13/09/10/1311247/linus-responds-to-rdrand-petition-with-scorn
 [2]:http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf
-[3]:http://slashdot.org/story/13/09/13/1228216/stealthy-dopant-level-hardware-trojans
\ No newline at end of file
+[3]:http://slashdot.org/story/13/09/13/1228216/stealthy-dopant-level-hardware-trojans