Merge pull request #6948 from acmesh-official/dev

sync

README.md

@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 | 🌐 DNS mode | Use DNS TXT records |
 | 🔗 [DNS alias mode](https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/wiki/DNS-alias-mode) | Use DNS alias for verification |
 | 📡 [Stateless mode](https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/wiki/Stateless-Mode) | Stateless verification |
-| 📌 DNS persist mode | Persistent DNS TXT record ([draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-01](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist/)) |
+| 📌 [DNS persist mode](https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/wiki/DNS-persist-mode) | Persistent DNS TXT record ([draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-01](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist/)) |
 
 ---
 
@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ acme.sh --renew -d example.com
 
 ### 🔟 Use DNS Persist Mode
 
+📖 Wiki: https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/wiki/DNS-persist-mode
+
 📚 Spec: [draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-01](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist/)
 
 DNS persist mode lets you place a **single, long‑lived `_validation-persist` TXT record** in your zone and reuse it for every subsequent issuance and renewal. There is no per-issuance challenge token, so renewals require **no DNS edits** — useful when DNS API access is not available but you still want unattended renewals.
@@ -502,6 +504,8 @@ acme.sh --renew -d example.com --force --ecc
 
 #### 📡 ACME Renewal Information (ARI) — RFC 9773
 
+📖 Wiki: https://github.com/acmesh-official/acme.sh/wiki/ARI
+
 If the CA exposes a `renewalInfo` endpoint in its ACME directory (Let's Encrypt, ZeroSSL, etc.), `acme.sh` follows [RFC 9773](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9773.html) automatically — **no flag needed, no opt-in**:
 
 | What | When | Why |

acme.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env sh
 
-VER=3.1.3
+VER=3.1.4
 
 PROJECT_NAME="acme.sh"
 
@@ -4870,8 +4870,12 @@ issue() {
     # renewal (--renew path), the CA advertises renewalInfo, and a prior
     # cert exists. --issue (even with --force) is not a renewal per RFC 9773
     # which speaks of "a clear predecessor certificate" issued by this CA.
+    # NO_ARI=1 (env, account.conf, or ca.conf) disables ARI entirely, so the
+    # "replaces" field is also omitted.
     _replaces_certID=""
-    if [ "$_ACME_IS_RENEW" = "1" ] && [ "$ACME_RENEWAL_INFO" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ]; then
+    if [ "$NO_ARI" = "1" ]; then
+      _debug "NO_ARI=1, omitting ARI 'replaces' field from newOrder"
+    elif [ "$_ACME_IS_RENEW" = "1" ] && [ "$ACME_RENEWAL_INFO" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ]; then
       _replaces_certID="$(_getARICertID "$CERT_PATH")"
       _debug "Adding ARI replaces" "$_replaces_certID"
     fi
@@ -5703,7 +5707,11 @@ $_authorizations_map"
   # with a time picked at random within the suggestedWindow. This both gives
   # the CA full control over renewal scheduling and disperses renewals across
   # the network so all clients don't hit the CA at the same instant.
-  if [ "$ACME_RENEWAL_INFO" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ] && [ -z "$_notAfter" ]; then
+  # Set NO_ARI=1 (env, account.conf, or ca.conf) to opt out and fall back to
+  # the legacy time-based renewal calculation.
+  if [ "$NO_ARI" = "1" ]; then
+    _debug "NO_ARI=1, skipping ARI suggestedWindow override"
+  elif [ "$ACME_RENEWAL_INFO" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ] && [ -z "$_notAfter" ]; then
     _ari_resp_new="$(_get_ARI "$CERT_PATH")"
     _debug2 "_ari_resp_new" "$_ari_resp_new"
     _ari_start_new="$(echo "$_ari_resp_new" | _egrep_o '"start" *: *"[^"]*' | sed 's/.*"//')"
@@ -5819,8 +5827,12 @@ renew() {
 
   # ARI (RFC 9773): fetch the CA's suggestedWindow on every renewal check.
   # If the window has started, renew now even if Le_NextRenewTime is in the future.
+  # Set NO_ARI=1 (env, account.conf, or ca.conf) to opt out and use only
+  # Le_NextRenewTime for the renewal decision.
   _ari_should_renew=""
-  if [ -z "$FORCE" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ]; then
+  if [ "$NO_ARI" = "1" ]; then
+    _debug "NO_ARI=1, skipping ARI suggestedWindow check"
+  elif [ -z "$FORCE" ] && [ -f "$CERT_PATH" ]; then
     if _initAPI && [ "$ACME_RENEWAL_INFO" ]; then
       _ari_resp="$(_get_ARI "$CERT_PATH")"
       _debug2 "_ari_resp" "$_ari_resp"
@@ -6853,13 +6865,13 @@ deactivate() {
 #cert
 _getAKI() {
   _cert="$1"
-  openssl x509 -in "$_cert" -text -noout | grep "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" -A 1 | _tail_n 1 | tr -d ' :'
+  ${ACME_OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl} x509 -in "$_cert" -text -noout | grep "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" -A 1 | _tail_n 1 | tr -d ': ' | sed "s/keyid//"
 }
 
 #cert
 _getSerial() {
   _cert="$1"
-  openssl x509 -in "$_cert" -serial -noout | cut -d = -f 2
+  ${ACME_OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl} x509 -in "$_cert" -serial -noout | cut -d = -f 2
 }
 
 #cert
@@ -6872,6 +6884,16 @@ _getARICertID() {
   _debug2 "_aki" "$_aki"
   _debug2 "_ser" "$_ser"
 
+  # RFC 9773 Section 4.1 requires the DER-encoded INTEGER value bytes of
+  # serialNumber. When the high bit of the first byte is set (>= 0x80) DER
+  # prepends a 0x00 sign byte to keep the integer positive; openssl's hex
+  # output strips that, so add it back. Boulder (LE) accepts either form,
+  # but Sectigo (ZeroSSL) is strict and rejects newOrder with HTTP 401
+  # "replaces field does not identify a certificate" if the byte is missing.
+  case "$_ser" in
+    [89aAbBcCdDeEfF]*) _ser="00$_ser" ;;
+  esac
+
   _akiurl="$(echo "$_aki" | _h2b | _base64 | _url_replace)"
   _debug2 "_akiurl" "$_akiurl"
   _serurl="$(echo "$_ser" | _h2b | _base64 | _url_replace)"